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ABSTRACT
Today’s business model for hardware designs frequently incorporates third-party
Intellectual Property (IP) due to the many benefits it can bring to a company. For instance,
outsourcing certain components of an overall design can reduce time-to-market by allowing each
party to specialize and perfect a specific part of the overall design. However, allowing thirdparty involvement also increases the possibility of malicious attacks, such as hardware Trojan
insertion. Trojan insertion is a particularly dangerous security threat because testing the
functionality of an IP can often leave the Trojan undetected. Therefore, this thesis work provides
an improvement on a Trojan detection method known as Structural Checking which analyzes
Register-Transfer Level (RTL) and gate-level soft IPs. Given an unknown IP, the Structural
Checking tool will break down the design primary ports and internal signals into assets that fall
into six characteristics. These characteristics organize how the IP is structured and provide
information about the unknown IP’s overall function. The tool also provides a library of known
designs referred to as the Golden Reference Library (GRL). All entries in the library are also
broken down into the same six characteristics and are either known to be clean or known to have
a Trojan inserted. An overall percent match for each library entry against the unknown IP is
calculated by first computing a percent match within each characteristic. A weighted average of
these percent matches makes up the final percentage. If the library entry with the best match is
known to have a Trojan inserted, then the unknown design is likely to have a Trojan as well and
vice versa. Due to the structural variability of soft IP designs, it is vital to provide the best
possible weighting of the six characteristics to best match the unknown IP to the most similar
library entry. This thesis work provides a statistical approach to finding the best weights to
optimize the Structural Checking tool’s matching algorithm.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Jia Di. He has provided me with great support and
guidance throughout my college career as both an undergraduate and graduate student. He is a
perfect example of a great mentor, and I’m glad I got the opportunity to work with him.
I would also like to thank Dr. Thao Le for her help and support during my graduate
career.

DEDICATION
To my Mom, Dad, and brothers for supporting me throughout my college career. They
have always given me the support I needed to be successful.
To my girlfriend, Kristen Tilley, for all her love and support. She provided me with great
advice to help me achieve this degree.

CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
2. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................... 4
2.1

Assets ...................................................................................................................... 4

2.1.1

Overview ......................................................................................................... 4

2.1.2

Internal Assets ................................................................................................. 4

2.1.3

External Assets................................................................................................ 5

2.1.4

Asset Filtering ................................................................................................. 5

2.1.5

Asset Pattern and Characteristics .................................................................... 7

2.2

Golden Reference Matching ................................................................................... 8

2.2.1

Overview ......................................................................................................... 8

2.2.2

Basic Matching Process .................................................................................. 8

2.2.3

Partial Matching .............................................................................................. 9

2.2.4

Golden Reference Library............................................................................. 10

3. METHODOLOGY AND IMPLEMENTATION ........................................................... 12
3.1

Asset Reassignment .............................................................................................. 12

3.2

Statistical Weighting ............................................................................................. 13

3.2.1

Overview ....................................................................................................... 13

3.2.2

Assessing Asset Quantity .............................................................................. 14

3.2.3

Assessing Asset Quality ................................................................................ 16

4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS ......................................................................................... 19
4.1

Overview ............................................................................................................... 19

4.2

Examples ............................................................................................................... 19

4.2.1

RS232, Basic-RSA, AES Modules ............................................................... 19

4.2.2

PIC16F84-T100 ............................................................................................ 20

4.2.3

MC8051-T500 Core ...................................................................................... 24

5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK ........................................................................ 26
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................ 28

GLOSSARY
Abbreviations
RTL

Register Transfer Level

IPs

Intellectual Properties

Soft IPs

Intellectual Properties under RTL or gate-level

GR

Golden Reference

GRL

Golden Reference Library

SC

Structural Checking

HPM

Highest percentage matching

EEPROM

Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory

RAM

Random Access Memory

VHDL

VHSIC Hardware Description Language

ALU

Arithmetic Logic Unit
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INTRODUCTION

Due to the growing number of third-party hardware IP vendors world-wide, the
importance of securing hardware designs has grown significantly. By outsourcing components
of a hardware design to other parties, the integrity of the overall design can be compromised.
One example of how a design can be compromised is through the insertion of a hardware Trojan
into a third-party component. Trojan-infested components often work as intended to hide the
Trojan inserted. Consequently, hardware Trojans are difficult to detect and can lead to very
damaging payloads. Some of these effects include leaking a secret key or shutting down a part
of the hardware during operation. Any compromised design can then end up in applications
where security is vital, such as defense applications. As a result, developing a method for
hardware Trojan detection is very important to guarantee the integrity of all hardware.
A significant area of research for hardware Trojan detection comes from side-channel
analysis. Side-channel analysis takes advantage of naturally occurring emissions of a circuit,
such as power and timing delays, to detect modifications to the circuit. Power analysis can be
effective when the Trojan infested circuit emits significantly different power readings compared
to the same circuit that is known to be clean. A drawback from this approach is that Trojans can
be very small and thus do not produce a significant power consumption to raise concerns about
the integrity of the circuit. Introduced in [1], different circuits were first partitioned and then
power analysis was performed. By observing the circuit in smaller portions, the difference in
power readings is more significant and leads to better detection of even small Trojans. Path
delay in [2], or timing analysis, seeks to find significant differences in how long a signal takes to
travel through a specific path within the circuit. However, similar to power analysis, the Trojan
inserted may not be very large which means that path delays alone may not be enough to indicate
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an inserted Trojan. While power and timing analysis are both valid methods of Trojan detection,
they both focus on detecting Trojans on hard IPs, or already manufactured chips. Even with
correct detection at the hard IP level, the infested chips become unreliable and there is a need for
a trusted hardware.
Hardware Trojan detection methods at the soft IP level are also under research. Soft IPs
include Register-Transfer Level (RTL) code and gate-level netlists. In [3], hardware Trojans are
detected in gate-level netlists using a Random Forrest Classifier. This machine learning
approach takes advantage of features that are commonly known in Trojan nets to then classify
unknown nets. Another machine learning technique used to detect Trojans from netlists is
through a support vector machine classifier [4]. The research conducted in [4] breaks down each
net into 5 characteristics and classifies each net as either Trojan infested or Trojan free based on
the knowledge of known Trojan free and infested nets. In addition to these approaches, there is
research of using Golden Reference Matching for Trojan detection as done in [5]. Golden
Reference Matching breaks down RTL code by labeling primary ports and internal signals with
assets, the signals’ contribution to the overall design. Upon completion of assigning assets, an
unknown IP is compared against the Golden Reference Library, a collection of soft IPs that are
known to be either be clean or Trojan-infested. If the unknown IP matches best with a Trojaninfested library entry then the unknown IP is likely to contain a Trojan, and vice versa. Building
on the work of [5], [6] introduces a way to use Golden Reference Matching with gate-level
netlists.
The rest of the thesis is organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 will cover
background information on assets, Structural Checking, and the process of Golden Reference
Matching with a Golden Reference Library. Chapter 3 will cover the design and implementation
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of a statistical based improvements on the Golden Reference Matching algorithm. Chapter 4
provides example soft IPs to prove the effectiveness of the improved algorithm. Chapter 5 will
then conclude the thesis and provide details on future work.
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2
2.1

BACKGROUND

Assets

2.1.1

Overview
A key component from the Structural Checking tool with Golden Reference Matching is

the concept of assets. Assets provide a description to primary ports and internal signals of soft
IPs. More specifically an asset provides a label to a signal about its purpose/function to the
overall design. For instance, a clock signal would be assigned what is known as a
SYSTEM_TIMING asset because a clock provides timing for the overall circuit. Each signal
can have multiple assets assigned to it to refine how it fits in the overall design. There are two
main categories of assets defined in the Structural Checking tool, internal assets and external
assets.
2.1.2

Internal Assets
Internal assets are intended to describe the function of internal signals in a soft IP, but they

can also be used for primary port signals. Most internal assets used in the tool were developed in
[7] and [8]. The research conducted in [8] added three internal assets specifically for a scanchain structure (OBSERVABLE, CONTROLLABLE, and PROTECTED). These three assets
differ from the rest of the internal assets because they require to be manually assigned to signals.
Most internal signals are assigned automatically as the Structural Checking tool parses the
Register-Transfer Level (RTL) code. Some examples of internal assets include
PROCESS_SENSITIVE and CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN. The PROCESS_SENSITIVE asset
describes a signal that is included in the sensitivity list of process from RTL code.
CONDITINAL_DRIVEN describes a signal that is within an “if/case” block in the RTL code
because its value depends on a certain condition to be met.
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2.1.3

External Assets
External assets are used to describe the function/purpose of primary ports in soft IPs.

Unlike internal assets, all external assets must be manually assigned to each primary port signal
through the use of the Structural Checking tool. These assets are broken up into 5 main
categories: Data, Timing, System Control, Specific System Control, and Miscellaneous. An
example from the Data category includes DATA_MEMORY which is assigned to signals that
are intended to store data for any type of memory. COUNT is an example from the Timing
category and this asset is assigned to signals that keep track of a count value for the IP. An
example from System Control includes HANDSHAKING which is assigned to signals that will
handle any type of handshaking operations for the IP. An example of System Specific Control
includes COMMUNICATION_CONTROL asset and it is assigned to a signal that controls
transmission with another component (such as a UART module). Finally, an example from the
Miscellaneous category includes ADDRESS_SENSITIVE and is assigned to signals that will
store any type of address for the IP, such as a memory address. From the work done in [5] and
[7] the Structural Checking tool currently has 58 external assets available for assignment to
primary ports.
2.1.4

Asset Filtering
The idea of asset filtering is to allow assets assigned on any signal of an IP to propagate

through connected signals. By propagating assets, the tool finds correlations between signals
and potentially finds signals that have conflicting assets. This allows the Structural Checking
tool to raise a flag about a potential Trojan in the circuit. Asset filtering was added to the
Structural Checking tool in [9]. External assets assigned to primary inputs propagate to all
signals that complete the path from the primary input to the dependent primary output.
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Likewise, external assets assigned to primary outputs propagate backwards through connected
signals to their dependent primary input. For internal assets there are a few exceptions to this
type of filtering process. When filtering a process sensitive asset, the propagation only traverses
to signals that are connected to the original signal and are contained within the same process
block. Another exception to traditional filtering comes from conditional assets
(CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN and CONDITIONAL_DRIVING). Similar to the process sensitive
asset, these assets only propagate within their conditional statements. All other internal assets
work with concurrent statements in soft IPs, and they follow the same asset filtering process as
external assets.

Figure 1: Simple ALU Asset Filtering
Figure 1 illustrates asset assignment to a simple ALU prior to asset filtering. In the
diagram input “A” contains data from some type of memory which is why it is assigned a
DATA_MEMORY asset. Input “B” stores data intended for computation which is why it is
assigned a DATA_COMPUTATINAL asset. The output of the ALU, “Result”, is assigned a
DATA_COMPUTATIONAL asset because the “Result” signal is the result of the ALU’s
computation. “Sel” is assigned a DATA_OP asset because it controls the operation that is
performed on the data of the ALU. Furthermore, signals “A”, “B”, and “Result” will have
6

PROCESS_SENSITIVE assets assigned to them. This occurs because “Sel” requires a process
block, due to syntax rules in soft IPs, and each of these signals are contained within the same
process block as “Sel”. Finally, a CONDITIONAL_DRIVING asset is assigned to “Sel” and a
CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN asset is assigned to “Result” because “Result’s” value depends on
the value of “Sel”. After asset filtering, “Result” will also be assigned DATA_MEMORY
because the asset comes from filtering input A’s asset to the output. Input “A” will add
DATA_COMPUTATIONAL to its assets because the output’s computational asset filters to A.
Input B will not have an additional DATA_COMPUTATIONAL asset after filtering from the
output to B because there is no need to duplicate assets on one signal. As a result, each signal
becomes more refined in how it fits into the design by filtering assets.
2.1.5

Asset Pattern and Characteristics
Resulting from the work done in [5], an asset pattern, which is written out to an asset file,

is a compilation of all asset traces of a soft IP. Asset traces are created for every port/internal
signal in a design and contain all assets assigned to it. Assets are broken down into six
characteristics. External assets that are assigned to primary input port signals form a
characteristic and they are denoted by “>” within a GRL file. Internal assets that are assigned to
primary input port signals form another characteristic and are denoted by “>*” within a GRL file.
Another characteristic includes external assets that are assigned to primary output ports and they
are denoted by “<” within a GRL file. Internal assets that are assigned to primary output port
signals form another characteristic and they are denoted by “<*” within a GRL file. The final
two characteristics are external assets assigned to internal signals and internal assets assigned to
internal signals. These two characteristics are denoted by “/” and “/*”, respectively, within a
GRL file.
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2.2

Golden Reference Matching

2.2.1

Overview
The concept of Golden Reference Matching is to take an unknown soft IP, compare it

against a Golden Library of soft IPs, which are known to be Trojan-free or Trojan-infested, and
determine if it contains a Trojan. For each library entry, the algorithm behind the matching
process calculates a percent match against the unknown IP by comparing the similarity of assets
between the designs. Based on the best percent match of the unknown IP against the Golden
Reference entries, Golden Reference Matching can provide a probabilistic result on whether or
not the unknown design contains a hardware Trojan and determine the overall functionality of
the design. Developed in [5], the SC tool uses a Golden Reference Library, which contains a list
of known Trojan free and Trojan infested IPs.
2.2.2

Basic Matching Process
Table 1: Basic Matching Example

Trace
1
2
3

Unknown IP Assets
DATA_COMMUNICATION
DATA_SENSITIVE, COUNT,
STATUS
DATA_SENSITIVE

GRL Entry Assets
DATA_COMMUNICATION
DATA_SENSITIVE,
HANDSHAKING, MEMORY_OP
DATA_MEMORY

Percent Match
100%
33%
0%

Table 1 provides a simple example of the matching process. Each row of Table 1 contains
the assets assigned to a single signal from the unknown IP and assets assigned to a single signal
from a GRL entry. In the first row the assets are identical which gives a 100% match. Trace
number 2 can only match 1 out of the 3 assets which produces a 33% match. Finally, trace 3 has
no identical assets between the unknown IP and the GRL entry which results in a 0% match.
These three assets traces come from the same characteristic which would result in a 44.33%
match for that characteristic. The same process of matching would be done for the other 5
characteristics with the unknown IP and GRL entries. After computing a percent match for all
8

characteristics, the overall percent match is calculated. To calculate the overall match, an
average is taken of the 6 percent matches from the characteristics. When calculating percent
matches for each of the characteristics, there are special cases such as either the unknown IP or
the GRL entry, or both do not have any assets in a given characteristic. In these special cases,
the characteristic is left out of the overall percent match calculation.
2.2.3

Partial Matching
In [5] the idea of partial matching was added to the Structural Checking tool’s matching

algorithm. Partial matching involved applying a 50% match between assets that were not
identical but shared a similar purpose in a design. For instance, in the Data category of assets,
there is a DATA_SENSITIVE asset that generically classifies a signal to be dependent on some
type of data. Within this same category there are assets such as DATA_MEMORY,
DATA_COMMUNICATION, etc. All of these other assets in the same category are specific
versions of the generic DATA_SENSITIVE asset. Consequently, the algorithm was altered to
provide a partial match if an asset from either the unknown or the Golden Reference Library
entry was generic while the other was specific.
Table 2: Partial Matching Example
Trace
1
2
3

Unknown IP Assets
DATA_COMMUNICATION
DATA_SENSITIVE, COUNT,
STATUS
DATA_SENSITIVE

GRL Entry Assets
DATA_COMMUNICATION
DATA_SENSITIVE,
HANDSHAKING, MEMORY_OP
DATA_MEMORY

Percent Match
100%
33%
50%

Table 2 provides the same example from Table 1. However, with partial matching, trace
3 now has a 50% match because DATA_SENSITIVE is a generic version of the
DATA_MEMORY asset. In this case the overall percent match for this characteristic is 61%
instead of 44.33%.
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2.2.4

Golden Reference Library
The GRL is a collection of soft IPS designs that have been collected from Trust-Hub

[10,11], OpenCores [12], and some in-house designs. All entries in the library first go through
the Structural Checking tool to generate an asset pattern for the design. After generating an asset
pattern, a functionality is added to the file to label the overall function of the soft IP. The
combination of the asset pattern and the functionality encompasses all information needed for a
library entry. All GRL entries are guaranteed to be correctly labeled in terms of Trojan-free
(whitelist) or Trojan-infested (blacklist) functionality because all designs come from trusted
sources. Table 3 below lists the functionalities that exist in the GRL.
Table 3: Functionalities
Whitelist Functionality
SHIFT_REGISTER
INTERRUPT UNIT
COMMUNICATION
ENCRYPTION_UNIT
COMPUTATIONAL
TIMING
CONTROL_GENERATION
REGISTER_FILE
PERIPHERAL
DECODER_ENCODER
DEBUG_INTERFACE
TOP_CONTROLLER
MICROPROCESSOR

Blacklist Functionality
TROJAN_ENCRYPTION_UNIT
TROJAN_TRIGGER
TROJAN_COMMUNICATION
TROJAN_SHIFT_REGISTER

Unknown IPs that match best with GRL entries with a “whitelist” functionality are given
that same functionality and are labeled as being clean. However, if an unknown IP matches best
with a GRL entry that has a “blacklist” functionality, then the unknown IP is given the same
functionality and is flagged as potentially contains a Trojan.
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Figure 2: Simple PIC GRL Entry
Figure 2 provides an example of a GRL entry. At the top of the file the entity’s name is
provided along with a breakdown of the type and number of signals used in the design. Then the
file provides a labeled functionality which is “INTERRUPT_UNIT” in the case of Figure 2. The
remainder of the file contains the asset pattern of this entry which is used for the matching
process.

11

3
3.1

METHODOLOGY AND IMPLEMENTATION

Asset Reassignment
The Structural Checking process described in Chapter 2 of this thesis leads to bias that

negatively impacts matching results. All designs that make up the Golden Reference Library,
described in Section 2.2.4, require manual assignment of external assets. Additionally, the
library has continued to grow in the lifespan of the Structural Checking tool. With this in mind,
several developers have contributed entries to the GRL at different stages of the tool’s
development. As a result, designs from later stages of the tool’s development were assigned
assets that did not exist in earlier stages. The manual process of assigning external assets causes
differences in what assets are assigned to signals within soft IPs. One developer may not fully
understand a design due to lack of documentation. Consequently, there could be an abundance
of generic assets assigned in this situation. Previously mentioned in Section 2.2.3, the Structural
Checking tool can handle matching generic assets to their specific asset counterparts with partial
matching. However, this way of matching always reduces the percent match to 50% even when
the assets could theoretically be identical but are not due to bias in asset assignment. In order to
alleviate these issues, the idea of asset reassignment was added to the tool’s matching algorithm.
When comparing external assets, the algorithm will perform a check on both the target
(unknown) IP’s assets and the library entry’s assets to see if one asset is a generic version of the
other. In the case that one asset is a generic version of the other, the more specific asset is
reassigned to the generic asset. For instance, if the target IP has a DATA_MEMORY asset
assigned to a signal and is compared to a DATA_SENSITIVE asset from the GRL entry, then
the target IP’s asset is reassigned to be DATA_SENSITIVE. This replaces partial matching in
the algorithm by now giving a 100% match to assets that are similar instead of 50% because the
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more specific asset has been reassigned. The process of reassignment does not damage any
original intent of assets assigned because each reassigned asset keeps the same general purpose
as the original assignment. The only change that occurs is that a specific asset changes to its
generic equivalent.
3.2
3.2.1

Statistical Weighting
Overview
As explained in Section 2.2, the overall percent match between the target IP and a GRL

entry is calculated by taking the average of the six percent matches from the six characteristics
that make up an asset pattern. Figure 3 below illustrates the equation used for this process and
denotes the six characteristics as “A” through “F”.

Figure 3: Equal Weight Percent Match
One drawback to averaging all percent matches from the characteristics is that each
characteristic then contributes equal weight to the overall percent match. However, external
assets provide more information to a soft IP’s functionality because external assets currently
offer more specific descriptions of how a signal functions within an IP. While internal assets do
contribute to the signal’s overall asset trace, they do not provide information on what function
the signal provides to the overall design. On the other hand, an external asset, such as
DATA_MEMORY, provides a specific description that the signal is both data and contributes to
some type of memory. In theory, external asset characteristics should be weighted more when
calculating the overall percent match.
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3.2.2

Assessing Asset Quantity
A common practice in statistical analysis is to weight final results when working with a

subgroup that is either underrepresented or overrepresented relative to the size of the full group.
For example, if the population of the Earth is known to be 51% female and 49% male, but a
survey involving just a small group is made up of 60% male and 40% female, then the final
results should be weighted. The female results should be multiplied by 51 over 40 (greater than
1) to account for females being underrepresented in the poll. Similarly, the male results should
be multiplied by 49 over 60 (less than 1) to account for males being overrepresented in the poll.
Tying in with asset pattern matching, a similar approach was considered to help weight the
six characteristics. For each GRL entry and the target IP, the number of assets per characteristic
was recorded. Next, the GRL entries were split into groups based on their functionalities (Table
3).
Table 4: Asset Quantity Example
GRL Entry #
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Input
External
6
2
5
5
9
8
7
9
4
7

Input
Internal
2
2
2
4
5
2
2
7
2
2

Output
External
4
0
3
3
5
5
5
5
2
6

Output
Internal
3
3
3
1
5
3
2
5
4
1

Signal
External
3
0
3
4
5
3
3
2
1
4

Signal
Internal
5
5
5
10
5
5
8
7
6
2

Table 4 provides an example of breaking down the GRL entries into their functionalities.
Each row in Table 4 is a different GRL entry with a COMMUNICATION functionality. The
remaining columns to the right of the GRL entry number column represent the six
characteristics: input ports assigned external assets, input ports assigned internal assets, external
ports assigned external assets, external ports assigned internal assets, internal signals assigned
14

external assets, and internal signals assigned intern assets. The numbers underneath each
characteristic column represent the number of assets defined in the characteristic for these 10
GRL entries.
In the statistical example provided earlier in this section, weight was determined by
taking the known value divided by the sampled value. In the case of soft IPs, there is no known
number of assets that should be in each characteristic because soft IPs can be designed in
numerous ways but still retain the same overall functionality. Therefore, for each GRL entry in
Table 4, weight was determined for each characteristic by taking the larger number of assets
(comparing number of assets in a characteristic between a GRL entry and the target IP) divided
by the smaller number. After calculating individual sets of weights for each GRL entry, a final
set of weights was determined for each functionality by taking an average weight for each
characteristic.
This process of determining a set of weights for each functionality in the GRL proved to
harm the overall percent match by matching target IPs to library entries that did not have the
same functionality. The inefficient nature of this approach relates to the idea that soft IPs can be
designed differently but still retain the same overall functionality. This fact indicates that the
number of assets in a characteristic provides no correlation to an IP’s functionality. The idea of
weighting characteristics was added to the matching process in order to account for the fact that
certain assets provide more information to an IP’s functionality. Consequently, the method for
determining weight should seek to use data that reflects how well assets in the GRL are matching
to the target IP as opposed to the number of assets. In other words, weight should consider the
quality of assets in the GRL.
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3.2.3

Assessing Asset Quality
Assessing the quality of assets in the GRL focuses on the frequency in which each asset

appears in the library. Matching assets that appear in all entries of the library provides little
information regarding which entry is most similar to the target IP as compared to assets that only
appear in a few entries. For instance, the SYSTEM_TIMING asset is commonly found in most
library entries because most entries have some type of timing component. On the other hand, the
DATA_ENCRYPTION asset is more commonly found in entries with an ENCRYPTION
functionality but is not common to all entries. Therefore, a DATA_ENCRYPTION asset can
provide more information about which entries are most similar to the target instead of a more
common asset, such as SYSTEM_TIMING. With this in mind, weighting should emphasize the
differences in frequency of each asset in the GRL.
In order to determine weight for the six characteristics described in Section 2.1.5, the first
step involves calculating the probability of each asset among all assets of the GRL.
𝑃(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡) =

∑829: 𝐺𝑅𝐿𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦2 . 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 # 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝑅𝐿 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠

Figure 4: Probability of Asset in GRL
The equation in Figure 4 runs through all “n” GRL entries and will either add one to the
numerator if the GRL entry contains the asset, or zero if the GRL entry does not contain the
asset. If multiple instances of the same asset exist in any one GRL entry, only one is added to
the total because the probability checks only for the presence of an asset. The number of entries
that contain the asset is then divided by the total number of GRL entries to obtain the probability
that a library entry has that asset.
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Table 5: Example GRL
GRL Entry #

Assets

1

SYSTEM_TIMING, DATA_ENCRYPTION, PROCESS_SENSITIVE

2

SYSTEM_TIMING, DATA_MEMORY, PROCESS_SENSITIVE

3

SYSTEM_TIMING, DATA_MEMORY, CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN

4

CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN, ADDRESS_SENSITIVE

5

SYSTEM_TIMING, CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN

Table 5 provides an example GRL to demonstrate calculating asset probability. There are
six unique assets defined in this GRL: SYSTEM_TIMING, DATA_ENCRYPTION,
PROCESS_SENSITIVE, DATA_MEMORY, CONDITIONAL_DRIVEN, and
ADDRESS_SENSITIVE. The probability for SYSTEM_TIMING is equal to four divided by
five because SYSTEM_TIMING is present in four of the five GRL entries. The probability for
the remaining assets would be calculated in the same manner.
With the probability of each asset calculated, the next step involves calculating a weight for
each asset.
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡BCCDE = 1 − 𝑃(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡)
Figure 5: Asset Weight Calculation
As shown in Figure 5, an asset weight is determined by subtracting the probability of an
asset from one. This type of calculation is thus determining the probability that an asset will not
be in a GRL entry. By assigning weight in this manner, assets that are not commonly found in
GRL entries will have higher weights compared to assets that show up frequently in the GRL.
After determining the weight for each asset in the GRL, one final set of weights for the six
characteristics can be calculated.
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∑829: 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡2 . 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 # 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
Figure 6: Characteristic Average Asset Weight
Figure 6 describes how to calculate the average weight of the matched assets in an
arbitrary characteristic. The numerator keeps a running total of asset weights for each asset that
was matched within a characteristic. The sum of matched asset weights is then divided by the
total number of matched assets in the characteristic to obtain an average weight. If the
calculation shows that a characteristic has a relatively high weight, this indicates that assets
matched within this characteristic tended to have higher weight. As a result, the assets within
this characteristic are less common in the GRL. Therefore, the characteristic should receive a
higher weight relative to the other characteristics when calculating the overall percent match
because the assets within the characteristic provide a more unique identification to the
functionality of the target IP.
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡LMNO =

𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐LMNO . 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡
∗ 100
∑Q29B 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐2 . 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡

Figure 7: Characteristic Weight Calculation
Figure 7 illustrates the final step in calculating the weight for an arbitrary characteristic,
“char.” The average asset weight, determined from the equation in Figure 6, of “char” is divided
by the sum of all characteristics’ average asset weights. The quotient is then converted into a
percentage based on each characteristic’s contribution to the total average asset weight from all
six characteristics. As a result, characteristics with higher average asset weight are weighted
more in the overall percent match calculation, which reflects the idea of weighting characteristics
based on the weight, or quality, of assets matched.
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4
4.1

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Overview
During testing, results from [13] were used to confirm the tool’s ability to maintain correct

classification with the changes made to the matching algorithm. The tested IPs include RS232,
Basic-RSA, and AES. In addition to these relatively smaller designs, a few microcontrollers
were used to test the improved algorithm. Due to the fact that the current state of the GRL
contains very few IPs similar in size to a microcontroller, the statistical based algorithm should
help extract important asset matches to obtain the best classification for each microcontroller.
4.2
4.2.1

Examples
RS232, Basic-RSA, AES Modules
A RS232 Trojan-infested module used during testing includes RS232-T700. RS232-T700

contains a Trojan in its transmitter which produces a denial-of-service attack on the module by
forcing the transmitter’s done signal to be stuck at 0.
Table 6: RS232-T700 Matching Results
Target IP
Uart.vhd
U_xmit.vhd
U_rec.vhd

Equal Weight Matching
Functionality
% Match
COMMUNICATION
100%
TROJAN_COMMUNICATION
99.206%
COMMUNICATION
90%

Statistical Based Matching
Functionality
% Match
COMMUNICATION
100%
TROJAN_COMMUNICATION
99.490%
COMMUNICATION
94.641%

Table 6 shows results from both the original and improved matching algorithms. In both
instances the algorithm correctly classifies the transmitter as containing a Trojan and thus
demonstrates the new algorithm’s ability to keep correct results from previous work.
The Basic-RSA module tested was BasisRSA-T200. This module is another denial-ofservice attack which disables encoding on the transmitter and decoding on the receiver.
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Table 7: BasicRSA-T200 Matching Results
Equal Weight Matching
Functionality

Target IP
RSACypher.vhd
Modmult.vhd

TROGAN_ENCRYPTION_UNIT
COMPUTATIONAL

%
Match
74.900%
92.5%

Statistical Based Matching
Functionality
TROGAN_ENCRYPTION_UNIT
COMPUTATIONAL

%
Match
83.426%
100%

Similar to the results of RS232-T700, this design was correctly classified by both
versions of the matching algorithm.
Finally, AES-T600 was used to further confirm the improved algorithm’s ability to
maintain correct classification. The secret key of the module can be discovered after a certain
plaintext is read. As shown in Table 8, the algorithm correctly classifies the IP as containing a
Trojan.
Table 8: AES-T600 Matching Results
Target IP
Top.vhd
Aes_128.vhd
Expand_key_128.vhd
S4.vhd
S.vhd
One_round.vhd
Table_lookup.vhd
T.vhd
xS.vhd
Final_round.vhd
Trojan_trigger.vhd
TSC.vhd

4.2.2

Equal Weight Matching
Functionality
% Match
TROJAN_ENCRYPTION_UNIT
45%
ENCRYPTION_UNIT
100%
ENCRYPTION_UNIT
100%
ENCRYPTION_UNIT
100%
ENCRYPTION_UNIT
100%
ENCRYPTION_UNIT
100%
ENCRYPTION_UNIT
100%
ENCRYPTION_UNIT
100%
ENCRYPTION_UNIT
100%
ENCRYPTION_UNIT
100%
TROJAN_TRIGGER
66.667%
TROJAN_SHIFT_REGISTER
93.75%

Statistical Based Matching
Functionality
% Match
TROJAN_ENCRYPTION_UNIT
44.017%
ENCRYPTION_UNIT
100%
ENCRYPTION_UNIT
100%
ENCRYPTION_UNIT
100%
ENCRYPTION_UNIT
100%
ENCRYPTION_UNIT
100%
ENCRYPTION_UNIT
100%
ENCRYPTION_UNIT
100%
ENCRYPTION_UNIT
100%
ENCRYPTION_UNIT
100%
TROJAN_TRIGGER
98.694%
TROJAN_SHIFT_REGISTER
94.129%

PIC16F84-T100
The benchmark PIC16F84-T100, acquired from Trust-Hub [10, 11], demonstrates

improvement in the overall percent match using the statistical weighting method described in
Section 3.2.3. Additionally, this microcontroller offers the GRL an additional trusted IP that is
relatively larger than most entries in the top-level section of the library. This microcontroller is
made up of two different types of memory (EEPROM and RAM), a watchdog timer, interrupt
ports, and I/O ports. Each of these components of the design are contained within one VHDL
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file. Once parsed by the SC tool, assets are assigned to the primary input and output ports.
These ports, and their corresponding assets, are provided in Table 9.
Table 9: PIC16F84-T100 Asset Assignment
Signal

Assets

clk_i

SYSTEM_TIMING

clk_o

SYSTEM_TIMING

eep_adr_o

ADDRESS_SENSITIVE

eep_dat_i

DATA_MEMORY

eep_dat_o

DATA_MEMORY

existeprom_i

MEMORY_OP

int0_i

INTERRUPT

int4_i

INTERRUPT

int5_i

INTERRUPT

int6_i

INTERRUPT

int7_i

INTERRUPT

mclr_n_i

RESET

pon_rst_n_i

RESET

porta_dir_o

PERIPHERAL_CONTROL

porta_i

DATA_PERIPHERAL

porta_o

DATA_PERIPHERAL

portb_dir_o

PERIPHERAL_CONTROL

portb_i

DATA_PERIPHERAL

portb_o

DATA_PERIPHERAL

powerdown_o

CLOCK_CONTROL

prog_adr_o

ADDRESS_SENSITIVE

prog_dat_i

DATA_MEMORY

ram_adr_o

ADDRESS_SENSITIVE
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Table 9 (Cont.)
Signal

Asset

Ram_dat_i

DATA_MEMORY

Ram_data_o

DATA_MEMORY

Rbpu_o

UNUSED

Rd_eep_ack_i

HANDSHAKING, MEMORY_OP, READ

Rd_eep_req_o

HANDSHAKING, MEMORY_OP, READ

Readram_o

HANDSHAKING, MEMORY_OP

Startclk_o

CLOCK_CONTROL

T0cki_i

TIMER_CONTROL

Wdt_clk_i

SUBSYSTEM_TIMING

Wdt_ena_i

CLOCK_CONTROL

Wdt_full_o

CLOCK_CONTROL

Wr_eep_ack_i

HANDSHAKING, MEMORY_OP, WRITE

Wr_eep_req_o

HANDSHAKING, MEMORY_OP, WRITE

Writeram_o

HANDSHAKING, MEMORY_OP

After completing asset assignment, the SC tool filters these assets to connected signals as
described in Section 2.1.4. Finally, the matching process was carried out both with equal
characteristic weights (no asset reassignment) and statistical characteristic weights (with asset
reassignment).
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Table 10: PIC Original Matching Results
GRL Entry

Overall Percent Match

Simple_pic

52.553%

Lcd16x2_ctrl

48.233%

Lcd_controller

44.148%

RSACypher_T100

43.414%

Spi_master_1

40.750%

Table 11: PIC Statistical Matching Results
GRL Entry

Overall Percent Match

Simple_pic

47.149%

Lcd16x2_ctrl

36.591%

RSACypher_T100

36.514%

Lcd_controller

31.785%

Spi_master_1

30.211%

Table 10 provides the top five overall percent matches from equal weighting of the
characteristics and no asset reassignment. Table 11 provides the top five overall percent matches
from statistical weighting of the characteristics with asset reassignment. While statistical
weighting did lower all percent matches, the overall results indicate better matching with GRL
entries that are most similar to the target’s functionality. The calculated weights for the
characteristics when matching this microcontroller were 20.908 for “input external”, 8.037 for
“input interal”, 26.276 for “output external”, 8.156 for “output internal”, 26.406 for. “signal
external”, and 9.345 for “signal internal”. As expected, characteristics with external assets were
weighted more due to the fact that they provide assets that produce a better description of each
IP’s functionality. Analyzing the results of Table 10, most GRL entries were within a few
percentage points of the next best match. However, the results from Table 11 show greater
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disparity among the results which indicates that the algorithm provided more separation based on
assets that were within each library entry. The “simple_pic” entry matched the most assets of
high weight with PIC16F84-T100 which reflects the idea of matching based on quality of assets.
This also proves the effectiveness of the statistical approach because the GRL entry that is most
similar in functionality to the PIC microcontroller is indeed the “simple_pic”.
4.2.3

MC8051-T500 Core
The 8051-microcontroller core tested is known to be Trojan-free. The core is made up of

control units for a finite state machine (FSM) and memory, an ALU (with several specialized
blocks for computations), a serial interface unit (SIU), and a timing unit (also handles interrupt
signals). External assets were assigned to the core’s top module, “MC8051_core.vhd”.
Additionally, external assets were assigned to some of the core’s internal signals because not all
subcomponents of the IP were fully connected to the primary ports of the top module. As
aforementioned, asset filtering would not be able to fully define the signals of subcomponents
without the manual assignment of internal signals. Once asset assignment was complete, asset
filtering was performed, and the matching process was done on the core using both equal weight
and statistical weight for the characteristics.
Table 12: MC8051-T500 Core Matching Results
Equal Weight Matching

Statistical Based Matching

Target IP

Functionality

% Match

Functionality

% Match

MC8051_core.vhd

COMMUNICATION

35.321%

INTERRUPT_UNIT

50.899%

MC8051_control.vhd

COMPUTATIONAL

44.871%

REGISTER_FILE

54.689%

Control_fsm.vhd

COMPUTATIONAL

47.767%

REGISTER_FILE

38.913%

Control_mem.vhd

INTERRUPT_UNIT

61.576%

INTERRUPT_UNIT

62.274%

MC8051_alu.vhd

COMPUTATIONAL

22.244%

COMPUTATIONAL

29.564%

Alumux.vhd

COMPUTATIONAL

55.565%

COMPUTATIONAL

46.519%
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Table 12 (Cont.)
Equal Weight Matching

Statistical Based Matching

Target IP

Functionality

% Match

Functionality

% Match

Alucore.vhd

COMPUTATIONAL

50.297%

COMPUTATIONAL

42.133%

Addsub_core.vhd

COMPUTATIONAL

44.250%

COMPUTATIONAL

41.169%

Addsub_cy.vhd

COMPUTATIONAL

46.875%

COMPUTATIONAL

44.748%

Addsub_ovcy.vhd

COMPUTATIONAL

46.875%

COMPUTATIONAL

44.748%

Comb_mltplr.vhd

COMPUTATIONAL

45.833%

COMPUTATIONAL

38.863%

Comb_divider.vhd

COMPUTATIONAL

37.500%

COMPUTATIONAL

35.399%

Dcml_adjust.vhd

COMPUTATIONAL

31.718%

COMPUTATIONAL

34.492%

MC8051_siu.vhd

COMMUNICATION

77.152%

COMMUNICATION

70.793%

MC8051_tmrctr.vhd

REGISTER_FILE

52.257%

INTERRUPT_UNIT

48.587%

When matching the top-level module, “MC8051_core.vhd”, the equal weighting matching
process determined the functionality of the core to be COMMUNICATION while the statistical
based process determined the functionality to be INTERRUPT_UNIT. The INTERRUPT_UNIT
functionality comes from the “simple_pic” GRL entry. Matching the 8051-microcontroller with
another microcontroller proves that the statistical algorithm found the best way to match the toplevel module. The 8051-core and “simple_pic” are still very different which is reflected in the
50% match at the top-level. The next three control files in Table 12 all matched with
functionalities that differed from expected. In theory, each design should match best with a
CONTROL_GENERATION functionality because each is intended to generate control signals
for the microcontroller. However, the GRL contains very few entries within this functionality
and the entries that do exist are related to program counters. The next few files in Table 12,
starting from “MC8051_alu.vhd” and going to “dcml_adjust.vhd”, are shown to be correctly
classified as COMPUTATIONAL by both matching approaches. Next, “MC8051_siu.vhd” is a
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serial interface component of the microcontroller which confirms the correct classification of
COMMUNICATION by both matching processes. Finally, “MC8051_tmrctr.vhd” contains
control signals for both timing and interrupt components of the 8051-core. Consequently, this
design theoretically matches best with a TIMING or INTERRUPT_UNIT functionality. In the
equal weight example, this component of the 8051 matches incorrectly with a REGISTER_FILE
functionality due to the large number of data assets that inflated its percent match with register
files in the GRL. However, the statistical based approach extracted a better match with an
INTERRUPT_UNIT functionality which reflects the designs interrupt control signals. The low
percent match in the statistical approach demonstrates that the best match is still different from
the component of the 8051-core.
5

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

The statistical based matching algorithm, with asset reassignment, proved to enhance the
matching algorithm for the Structural Checking tool. By calculating weights for individual
assets, the tool can better determine how well an asset can uniquely identify a soft IP. Using
asset weights helped facilitate a way to weight the six characteristics by providing a numerical
representation of how important each characteristic is to classification. Characteristics with
relatively high weights contained more assets that provide a more unique identification for a
target IP. The tests done in this thesis indicate that the statistical based algorithm is an effective
approach to matching. In the tests performed in Section 4.2.1, all Trojan test cases were not only
classified correctly but were also given a higher percent match using the statistical matching
process. Furthermore, the microcontrollers tested were able to match with similar library entries
but with relatively low percent matches. The low percent matches reflect the fact that the GRL
does not contain very many TOP_CONTROLLER entries and thus makes it difficult for a
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microcontroller to find a high percent match. To increase the percent match of soft IPs similar in
size to a microcontroller, more designs of that size can be added to the GRL in the future. In
addition to more GRL entries, the matching algorithm can continue to improve with additional
assets in order to better refine the purpose of each signal within an IP. Finally, future work can
also continue to grow the list of functionalities to provide the matching algorithm with more
options to classify unknown designs.
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